Bostock v. Clayton County, 590 U.S. 644 (2020), is a United States Supreme Court decision holding that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits employment discrimination “because of sex,” extends to discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity. The ruling was decided on June 15, 2020 by a 6-3 majority, with Justice Neil Gorsuch writing the opinion joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and the four liberal justices.

The case consolidated three separate lower-court disputes. Gerald Bostock, a child welfare services coordinator in Clayton County, Georgia, was fired after joining a gay recreational softball league. Donald Zarda, a skydiving instructor in New York, was terminated shortly after disclosing he was gay. Aimee Stephens, a Michigan funeral home employee, was dismissed after informing her employer she would be transitioning from male to female. The Eleventh Circuit ruled against Bostock; the Second Circuit ruled in Zarda's favor; and the Sixth Circuit ruled in Stephens's favor. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the circuit split.

Justice Gorsuch's majority opinion applied what it described as a textual analysis of Title VII's plain language. The majority reasoned that because an employer who fires a male employee for being attracted to men would not fire a female employee for the same attraction, the employer is necessarily treating the male employee differently “because of sex.” The same logic was applied to transgender employees: terminating an employee for transitioning involves taking the employee's sex into account in a way that drives the employment decision. The majority declined to address whether other statutes or constitutional provisions raised separate questions, limiting the holding to Title VII in the employment context.

Justice Samuel Alito, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, dissented, arguing that the majority's reasoning was not textual interpretation but judicial legislation - that Congress in 1964 did not intend to include sexual orientation or gender identity, and that updating the statute's meaning is a legislative, not judicial, function. Justice Brett Kavanaugh dissented separately, concurring with the dissent's statutory argument while emphasizing the role of democratic processes in resolving such questions.

The Court's opinion explicitly noted that it was not resolving questions about religious liberty, sex-segregated bathrooms, locker rooms, or dress codes, nor issues arising under other federal statutes or constitutional provisions. It also noted that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) might provide defenses for religious employers in future cases not before the Court. ¹⁾ Subsequent litigation has addressed several of these open questions, particularly at the intersection of Title VII and the First Amendment's religion clauses.

There is no single legal or scholarly consensus on whether the majority opinion reflects sound textualist methodology or constitutes judicial legislation. The debate tracks longstanding disputes in statutory interpretation theory. See Legal Interpretation Consensus.

• The majority opinion correctly applied textualism - Supporters argue Gorsuch's reasoning is consistent with the textualist method championed by the late Justice Scalia: courts apply the plain meaning of statutory text, not the subjective expectations of legislators. See Textualist Defense Viewpoint.

• The majority opinion is judicial legislation - Critics, including the dissenters, contend that the ruling substitutes judicial policy preferences for democratic deliberation, and that Title VII's original public meaning in 1964 cannot plausibly have included sexual orientation or gender identity. See Judicial Legislation Viewpoint.

• The decision does not go far enough - Some legal advocates argue the ruling's narrow framing leaves too many questions open, particularly regarding discrimination in housing, education, and public accommodations outside Title VII's scope. See Scope Limitation Viewpoint.

• Religious liberty exemptions should be broad - Some religious employers and advocates argue that compelling them to retain or accommodate employees who violate sincere religious beliefs about sex and sexuality constitutes an unconstitutional burden on religious exercise. See Religious Liberty Viewpoint.

• Gender identity and sexual orientation are categorically distinct - Some legal analysts argue the Court erred in treating sexual orientation and gender identity as analytically equivalent under a sex-discrimination framework, and that the two raise substantially different legal and factual questions. See Category Distinction Viewpoint.

• Bostock v. Clayton County - History
• Bostock v. Clayton County - Debate
• Bostock v. Clayton County - Legal Interpretation Consensus
• Civil Rights Act of 1964
• Title VII
• Religious Freedom Restoration Act
• Statutory Interpretation
• Textualism
• Originalism
• Transgender Employment Discrimination

1. Bostock v. Clayton County, 590 U.S. 644 (2020). https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/19pdf/17-1618_hfci.pdf
2. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
3. Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018).
4. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2018).
5. Bostock v. Clayton County, 590 U.S. at 660-683 (majority opinion, Gorsuch, J.).
6. Id. at 686-739 (Alito, J., dissenting).
7. Id. at 739-753 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
8. Id. at 681 (majority opinion noting questions not decided).