Originalism is a family of theories of legal and constitutional interpretation holding that the meaning of a legal text - most commonly the United States Constitution - should be determined by reference to its meaning at the time of its adoption. What exactly constitutes that original meaning, and how it should be applied to contemporary disputes, are themselves contested questions within and beyond originalist scholarship.

Originalism has been a major force in American legal theory since at least the 1970s and 1980s, when figures such as Robert Bork and Edwin Meese articulated it as a counterweight to what they characterized as the judicial activism of the Warren and Burger Courts. Since then, the framework has diversified considerably. Contemporary originalist scholars debate whether the relevant anchor is the intent of the Framers (original intent), the public meaning of the text at ratification (original public meaning), or the expected application of the text by its ratifiers (original expected application). Original public meaning, associated with scholars such as Antonin Scalia and later Randy Barnett and Lawrence Solum, became the dominant academic formulation by the early twenty-first century.

Originalism's relationship to stare decisis - the doctrine of precedent - raises ongoing questions. Critics argue that a consistently applied originalism would require overruling landmark precedents, including decisions with broad public acceptance. Proponents respond variously that precedent can be accommodated within originalist theory, that some departures from original meaning are nonetheless binding as settled law, or that correcting prior errors is precisely the point.

The interpretive method intersects with debates about democratic legitimacy, judicial restraint, and the institutional role of courts. Supporters argue it constrains judges to a defined interpretive task and preserves democratic self-governance; critics argue it is indeterminate, ideologically selective in application, or unsuited to a document intended to govern across centuries.

Originalism has practical consequences for contested constitutional questions including gun rights, executive power, the scope of the Commerce Clause, and the application of the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection and due process guarantees to questions of race, sex, and other classifications. The decision in Bostock v. Clayton County (2020), in which Justice Neil Gorsuch applied a textualist methodology to reach a result many conservatives opposed, illustrates the contested relationship between originalism, textualism, and expected outcomes. See Bostock v. Clayton County.

Originalism as constitutional fidelity - Proponents hold that the Constitution's meaning was fixed at ratification and that judges have no legitimate authority to update it through interpretation. On this view, constitutional change should come through Article V amendment, not judicial decision. See originalism-constitutional-fidelity-viewpoint.

Original public meaning originalism - A dominant strand within contemporary originalist scholarship holds that the relevant fixed point is the meaning a reasonable, informed member of the public would have assigned to the text at ratification, not the subjective intentions of the Framers. See originalism-original-public-meaning-viewpoint.

Originalism as living constitutionalism's corrective - Some adherents frame originalism primarily as a critique of non-originalist approaches, arguing that living constitutionalism permits unaccountable judicial policymaking. See originalism-anti-living-constitutionalism-viewpoint.

Skepticism of originalism's determinacy - Critics argue that original meaning is frequently underdetermined - that historical sources underdetermine outcomes in precisely the cases where interpretive guidance is most needed - and that originalism therefore fails on its own terms. See originalism-indeterminacy-critique-viewpoint.

Originalism and racial justice (critical perspective) - Some scholars argue that originalism, applied consistently, would undermine civil rights precedents and entrench constitutional interpretations reflecting the exclusions of the founding era. The relationship between originalism and Brown v. Board of Education is a central contested point. See Brown v. Board of Education - Originalist Critique Viewpoint and Brown v. Board of Education - Constitutional Vindication Viewpoint.

New originalism and progressive applications - A smaller body of scholarship argues that original public meaning, properly reconstructed, supports progressive constitutional outcomes, including robust readings of Reconstruction-era amendments. See originalism-progressive-applications-viewpoint.

Originalism and the Civil Rights Act - Distinct from constitutional originalism, an originalist approach to statutory interpretation bears on how the Civil Rights Act of 1964 should be read. See Civil Rights Act of 1964 - Originalist Viewpoint.

Originalism and Brown v. Board of Education - Whether originalism can justify or requires the outcome in Brown is among the most-debated questions in originalist scholarship, with significant disagreement over the original public meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. See Brown v. Board of Education - Originalist Critique Viewpoint and Brown v. Board of Education - Constitutional Vindication Viewpoint.

Bostock v. Clayton County and textualism - The majority opinion's application of textualist methodology to extend Title VII protections to gay and transgender employees divided originalist and conservative legal thinkers over the relationship between original public meaning and anticipated application. See Bostock v. Clayton County.

• Originalism - History - History of originalism as a legal and political movement
• originalism-vs-living-constitutionalism-viewpoint-debate - Structured exchange between originalist and living constitutionalist positions
• originalism-indeterminacy-debate - Debate over whether original meaning is sufficiently determinate to guide decisions
• originalism-constitutional-fidelity-viewpoint - Originalism as democratic and constitutional fidelity
• originalism-original-public-meaning-viewpoint - Original public meaning as the dominant contemporary formulation
• originalism-progressive-applications-viewpoint - Arguments for progressive originalism
• originalism-anti-living-constitutionalism-viewpoint - Originalism as critique of judicial activism
• originalism-indeterminacy-critique-viewpoint - Scholarly skepticism of originalism's determinacy
• Brown v. Board of Education - Originalist Critique Viewpoint
• Brown v. Board of Education - Constitutional Vindication Viewpoint
• Civil Rights Act of 1964 - Originalist Viewpoint
• Bostock v. Clayton County
• United States Bill of Rights
• United States of America — Conservative American Viewpoint
• Constitutional Interpretation - Main topic overview of interpretive methods

1. Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law (New York: Free Press, 1990). 2. Edwin Meese III, “The Attorney General's View of the Supreme Court: Toward a Jurisprudence of Original Intention,” Public Administration Review 45 (1985): 701-704. 3. Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997). 4. Randy E. Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution: The Presumption of Liberty (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004). 5. Lawrence B. Solum, “What Is Originalism? The Evolution of Contemporary Originalist Theory,” in The Challenge of Originalism: Theories of Constitutional Interpretation, ed. Grant Huscroft and Bradley W. Miller (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 12-41. 6. Bostock v. Clayton County, 590 U.S. 644 (2020). 7. Jack M. Balkin, Living Originalism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011). 8. Jamal Greene, “Selling Originalism,” Georgetown Law Journal 97, no. 3 (2009): 657-721. 9. Michael W. McConnell, “Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions,” Virginia Law Review 81, no. 4 (1995): 947-1140.