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Textualism is a judicial interpretation method that prioritizes the plain meaning of statutory text as the primary guide for legal analysis. This approach emphasizes adherence to the written language of laws and regulations over alternative methods such as purposivism, which considers legislative intent or policy goals, and intentionalism, which focuses on the subjective purposes behind statutes. Originating in legal theory and U.S. constitutional law, textualism has become a dominant framework for statutory interpretation, particularly in the federal judiciary.

Textualism plays a pivotal role in contemporary American jurisprudence, influencing both statutory and constitutional interpretation. A landmark case illustrating its application is *Bostock v. Clayton County* (2020), where the Supreme Court held that discrimination based on “sex” under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act includes protection for LGBTQ+ individuals. The decision demonstrated textualism's capacity to yield broad interpretations despite the absence of explicit legislative intent on the issue.

The method rejects reliance on legislative history or subjective intent, instead grounding decisions in the text itself. This stance has been central to debates over provisions like the Equal Protection Clause and Title VII, where conflicts arise between textualist readings and other interpretive approaches. Tensions also exist with originalism, as textualists focus on the text's meaning at the time of adoption or interpretation, while originalists emphasize historical intent.

Key institutions promoting textualism include the Federalist Society, which advocates for its principles among legal scholars and judges. Prominent proponents like Justice Clarence Thomas advocate for a strict form of textualism that minimizes judicial discretion. The American Constitution Society, by contrast, supports purposivist approaches to interpretation.

Other significant cases include *National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius* (2012), where the Court upheld the individual mandate under the taxing power but struck down the Medicaid expansion as an unconstitutional coercion of states, demonstrating limits on congressional authority rather than primarily textualist reasoning. Precedents like *Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc.* (2017) and *Zadvydas v. Davis* (2001) established frameworks for statutory interpretation. In *Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo* (2024), the Court overruled *Chevron deference*, a decision with significant textualist implications by rejecting judicial deference to administrative agencies in favor of statutory text.

Textualism intersects with several ongoing legal debates: * chevron-deference: The doctrine's application is scrutinized for consistency with textualist principles, raising questions about judicial deference to administrative agencies. * purposivism-vs-textualism-in-legal-interpretation-debate: Textualists hold that courts must apply the statute's plain text and may not consult legislative history or policy rationale when the words are unambiguous; purposivists counter that text alone is insufficient and that legislative purpose is a legitimate and necessary interpretive tool, especially when statutory language is vague or yields unexpected results. * Constitutional Originalism: Tensions exist with originalism, as textualists prioritize the text's meaning at the time of adoption, while originalists emphasize historical intent.

Strict textualism follows Justice Antonin Scalia's approach, advocating rigid adherence to text without regard to context or evolving societal norms. Pragmatic textualism allows for adaptive interpretation within the bounds of statutory language, balancing fidelity to text with practical application. Living textualism permits flexibility in applying textual principles to contemporary issues, accommodating changing circumstances while respecting the original text. New textualism emphasizes linguistic evidence and empirical methods, such as corpus linguistics, to refine statutory interpretation.

* Constitutional Originalism * Bostock v. Clayton County * purposivism-vs-textualism-in-legal-interpretation-debate * regulatory-response-controversy-post-bostock * chevron-deference * skidmore-deference * national-federation-of-independent-business-v-sebelius

1. Richard A. Posner, *Against Interpretive Nihilism: The Necessity of Interpretation*, 1987. 2. Antonin Scalia, *A Matter of Interpretation*, 1997. 3. William Baude and Stephen Sachs, *The Law of Interpretation*, 2023.