The nationalist federalism viewpoint holds that the Tenth Amendment does not meaningfully constrain federal power beyond what is already implied by the enumerated powers doctrine, and that the amendment functions primarily as a truism rather than an independent source of judicially enforceable limits on federal authority. Proponents argue that a robust national government operating through broad readings of enumerated powers - particularly the Commerce Clause, the Necessary and Proper Clause, and the Spending Clause - is both constitutionally legitimate and practically necessary for a modern republic. This position is associated with progressive constitutionalists, New Deal liberals, and certain nationalist conservatives who prioritize federal uniformity over state autonomy.

Nationalist federalism proponents argue that the Tenth Amendment's text - “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people” - adds nothing substantive to the constitutional structure. Because the federal government already possesses only delegated powers, the amendment merely restates what follows logically from Article I. Justice Stone gave this reading its canonical judicial expression in United States v. Darby (1941), writing that the Tenth Amendment “states but a truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered.”¹⁾ On this view, the amendment cannot serve as an independent veto on legislation that falls within a legitimate enumerated power.

Proponents hold that the enumerated powers, properly construed, reach most matters of national concern. The Commerce Clause, they argue, was understood by the founding generation to extend to economic activity that, in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce - a reading the Supreme Court adopted in Wickard v. Filburn (1942) and reaffirmed in Gonzales v. Raich (2005).²⁾ The Necessary and Proper Clause further authorizes Congress to choose the means it deems appropriate to execute those powers, as Marshall established in McCulloch v. Maryland (1819).³⁾ Together, these provisions leave little practical room for a Tenth Amendment override.

A foundational premise of nationalist federalism is that decentralized governance is structurally inadequate for problems that cross state lines or require uniform rules. Proponents point to the failures of the Articles of Confederation, the inability of states to regulate the national economy during the Gilded Age, and the resistance of Southern states to civil rights enforcement as concrete demonstrations that state sovereignty, left robust, produces inequality, race-to-the-bottom regulatory competition, and collective action failures. Federal power, on this account, is not a threat to liberty but often its precondition.

Many nationalist federalism proponents are skeptical of or opposed to the anti-commandeering doctrine developed in New York v. United States (1992) and Printz v. United States (1997), under which Congress may not conscript state governments as administrators of federal programs.⁴⁾ They argue this doctrine lacks firm textual or historical grounding, impedes effective federal governance, and was developed by a Court ideologically committed to shrinking federal authority rather than reading the Constitution faithfully.

Some proponents accept that federalism represents a genuine constitutional value while insisting the primary enforcement mechanism is political rather than judicial. On this view, the structure of the Senate, the state role in federal elections, and political accountability adequately protect state prerogatives without courts inventing freestanding Tenth Amendment limits. Herbert Wechsler's influential 1954 article “The Political Safeguards of Federalism” articulated this argument, contending that federal courts have no principled basis for policing the federal-state boundary through judicially unmanageable doctrines.⁵⁾

The nationalist reading of federal power has deep roots in the Hamiltonian tradition. Alexander Hamilton's defense of the National Bank, his broad construction of “general welfare,” and his vision of an energetic central government represent the earliest systematic articulation of the position.⁶⁾ John Marshall's opinions in McCulloch and Gibbons v. Ogden (1824) gave the nationalist reading its foundational judicial form.⁷⁾

The position gained its modern institutional shape during the New Deal. After the Hughes Court's initial resistance to New Deal legislation on narrow Commerce Clause and nondelegation grounds, the “switch in time” of 1937 and subsequent appointments produced a Court willing to sustain broad federal regulatory power. The Darby and Wickard decisions effectively retired meaningful Tenth Amendment limits for a generation.

The Warren and Burger Courts largely maintained this posture. It was not until the Rehnquist Court's “federalism revolution” of the 1990s - Lopez, Morrison, New York, Printz, and Alden - that the Tenth Amendment and its structural analogues regained doctrinal force, prompting nationalist proponents to defend the New Deal settlement against what they characterized as judicial activism in the service of conservative policy preferences.⁸⁾ The Roberts Court's decision in NFIB v. Sebelius (2012), which limited the Spending Clause as a vehicle for coercing state compliance with the Affordable Care Act, renewed these concerns.⁹⁾

John Marshall (1755-1835) - Chief Justice whose opinions in McCulloch and Gibbons established the broad nationalist reading of federal enumerated powers that nationalist federalism proponents continue to invoke as the Constitution's authoritative interpretation.

Herbert Wechsler (1909-2000) - Columbia law professor whose “Political Safeguards” article provided the theoretical framework for treating federalism as a structural and political rather than judicially enforceable constraint, influencing a generation of constitutional scholars.

Akhil Reed Amar - Yale constitutional scholar who argues that the Tenth Amendment was understood by its ratifiers as largely declaratory, and that the Constitution's nationalist features are more central to its original meaning than states'-rights advocates acknowledge.¹⁰⁾

Erwin Chemerinsky - Dean of UC Berkeley School of Law and a prominent critic of the Rehnquist Court's federalism decisions, arguing that they lack historical grounding and have impeded the federal government's ability to address national problems.¹¹⁾

Nationalist liberal policy intellectuals - Political analysts and policy thinkers who argue that effective progressive governance requires a strong national government unconstrained by judicially imposed federalism limits.

Some nationalist conservatives - A minority strand within conservatism, associated with figures like Michael Lind and national conservatives who prioritize federal industrial and social policy, accepts nationalist readings of federal power for different policy ends, rejecting the libertarian federalism more common on the right.¹²⁾

Proponents disagree on whether to defend the New Deal constitutional settlement purely on pragmatic grounds or to argue that it reflects the Constitution's original meaning. Some, following Akhil Amar, mount an originalist defense of nationalist readings. Others, more openly in the living constitutionalist tradition, argue that the New Deal settlement represents legitimate constitutional adaptation to changed circumstances regardless of original intent.

There is also disagreement about the Spending Clause and the proper limits on conditional grants-in-aid. Even proponents of broad federal power sometimes acknowledge, after NFIB v. Sebelius, that coercive conditions on federal funding raise distinct concerns from direct regulation - though they typically draw the line at a different place than the Court's current majority.

Finally, nationalist conservatives and nationalist liberals share skepticism of strong Tenth Amendment limits but diverge sharply on the purposes for which federal power should be used, producing periodic coalition and conflict depending on which party holds federal power.

• Tenth Amendment - Main Topic
• States' Rights Viewpoint
• Nullification Viewpoint
• Cooperative Federalism Viewpoint
• Tenth Amendment - History
• Tenth Amendment - Debate
• Commerce Clause
• Necessary and Proper Clause
• New Deal Constitutionalism

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