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Scientific realism is the philosophical position that the unobservable entities and processes posited by successful scientific theories-such as electrons, black holes, or molecular structures-actually exist in the world, and that well-confirmed scientific knowledge provides an increasingly accurate approximation of objective reality. This view holds particular sway among philosophers of science, especially within analytic philosophy of science, where it serves as a foundational stance for interpreting the epistemological and ontological implications of scientific progress. Realists argue that the predictive success and explanatory power of mature theories provide strong justification for believing in their referential content, contending that theoretical constructs are not merely useful fictions but genuine features of the natural world. The scope of scientific realism extends beyond specific entities to encompass scientific laws and general theoretical frameworks, framing scientific inquiry as a cumulative process of approximating deeper truths about nature.

Scientific realists advance several core arguments to justify their position that scientific theories accurately describe an objective reality. One prominent line of reasoning is the no-miracles argument, which contends that the predictive success and explanatory power of mature scientific theories would be miraculous if they were not at least approximately true. Critics like Bas van Fraassen have challenged this by suggesting that empirical adequacy could be achieved through instrumentalist interpretations, but realists such as Hilary Putnam counter that such a position fails to account for the depth and consistency of scientific progress. Another key argument is inference to the best explanation, which holds that scientific explanations are most compelling when they posit real entities causing observable phenomena. Peter Lipton's work on abduction emphasizes this by arguing that successful predictions and interventions-such as those in quantum mechanics or evolutionary biology-are best understood as tracking genuine causal mechanisms. Finally, realists point to selective retention, noting that successor theories often preserve key elements of their predecessors (e.g., Fresnel's wave optics equations being preserved within Maxwell's electrodynamics, or Newtonian mechanics emerging as a limiting case of special relativity), which suggests a progressive approximation to truth. Larry Laudan has critiqued this by highlighting discredited theories like the phlogiston theory, but realists respond that such cases involve incomplete evidence rather than undermining the overall pattern of retention.

John Worrall argues for a moderated form of scientific realism, critiquing naive realism while defending the view that theoretical structures provide genuine knowledge about reality, as outlined in his 1989 essay “Structural Realism: The Best of Both Worlds?” Ian Hacking advances an experimentalist variant, contending in *Representing and Intervening* (1983) that entities are real if they can be manipulated experimentally. Nancy Cartwright advocates for localized realism, asserting in *How the Laws of Physics Lie* (1983) that scientific laws apply only to idealized models rather than universal truths.

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1. Hilary Putnam, “What is Mathematical Truth?”, in *Mathematics, Matter and Method*, Philosophical Papers, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 60–78. 2. Bas C. van Fraassen, *The Scientific Image*, Oxford Monographs on Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980). 3. Ian Hacking, *Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). 4. Larry Laudan, “A Confutation of Convergent Realism,” *Philosophy of Science*, vol. 48, no. 1 (March 1981), 19–49.