The debate over whether the U.S. Constitution should be interpreted according to its original public meaning or adapted to contemporary values lies at the heart of American constitutional jurisprudence. This dispute centers on the proper role of judges in applying an 18th-century text (the U.S. Constitution, 1787) to a society that has undergone profound transformations, including the adoption of amendments like the 14th Amendment (1868), which extended equal protection and due process rights. Originalists, such as Robert Bork in *The Tempting of America* (1990), argue for fidelity to the original understanding of constitutional language, contending that judicial restraint preserves democratic legitimacy and legal stability. In contrast, living constitutionalists like Ronald Dworkin in *Freedom's Law* (1996) advocate for an evolving interpretation that responds to societal changes, emphasizing the document's enduring principles over rigid historical constraints. The disagreement reflects deeper divisions: originalists prioritize textualism and the intent of the framers, while living constitutionalists stress the need for judicial adaptability in addressing modern moral and legal challenges.

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Originalists argue that the U.S. Constitution should be interpreted according to its original public meaning-that is, the understanding of its text held by those who ratified it. This approach emphasizes textual fidelity and historical context over contemporary moral or political preferences. Key figures like Antonin Scalia in *A Matter of Interpretation* (1997) contend that judges must adhere strictly to the Constitution's plain language as understood at the time of ratification, ensuring legal stability and democratic accountability.

Original public meaning is central to this framework, drawing on sources such as Federalist Papers to clarify ambiguous terms. Alexander Hamilton's writings in *The Federalist Papers* are often cited to illuminate the framers' intentions. Originalists reject the idea that constitutional interpretation should evolve with societal changes, asserting that such adaptations undermine the rule of law by allowing judges to substitute their personal values for textual constraints.

In legal practice, originalism has been invoked in landmark cases like Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), where defenders of “separate but equal” argued that racial segregation did not violate the 14th Amendment because it aligned with the historical understanding of equal protection. Similarly, Justice Hugo Black's dissent in *Griswold v. Connecticut* (1965) exemplified judicial restraint by insisting that courts must not impose modern notions of privacy onto a Constitution devoid of explicit guarantees on such matters.

Originalists also stress the non-delegation doctrine, holding that Congress cannot transfer legislative power to unelected bodies without clear constitutional authorization. Herbert Wechsler's critique in *Principles, Politics, and Fundamental Law* (1961) highlights the risks of non-originalist methods, arguing they blur the line between law and policy-making.

Living constitutionalists argue that the U.S. Constitution must be interpreted in light of evolving societal norms and values to remain effective and just. This approach emphasizes the document's enduring principles rather than strict adherence to its original text, allowing judges to adapt legal interpretation to contemporary circumstances.

A key example is substantive due process, which living constitutionalists argue protects unenumerated rights not explicitly listed in the Constitution but deemed fundamental under modern standards. In *Grutter v. Bollinger* (2003), the Supreme Court upheld affirmative action policies, asserting that educational diversity is a compelling interest, demonstrating how living constitutionalism can accommodate changing notions of equality.

The landmark case *Brown v. Board of Education* (1954) illustrates this philosophy by overturning *Plessy v. Ferguson* (1896), which had endorsed racial segregation under the “separate but equal” doctrine. The Court recognized that societal progress had rendered segregation unconstitutional, reflecting a living interpretation of equal protection.

Similarly, in *Regents v. Bakke* (1978), Justice Thurgood Marshall's dissent advocated for an evolving understanding of affirmative action, arguing that the Constitution's principles must be applied flexibly to address systemic inequalities. This view underscores the role of precedent and societal progress in constitutional adjudication.

Living constitutionalists contend that rigid originalism fails to account for moral advancements, such as protections for privacy (*Griswold v. Connecticut*, 1965) or same-sex marriage (*Obergefell v. Hodges*, 2015). They assert that the Constitution's framers could not have anticipated modern challenges, necessitating an interpretive framework capable of growth.

Both originalists and living constitutionalists acknowledge that the U.S. Constitution provides a foundational framework for American governance. They concur that judicial interpretation plays an essential role in applying constitutional principles to specific cases, as established by landmark decisions like Marbury v. Madison (1803). Additionally, both sides recognize the importance of understanding the original public meaning of the Constitution, drawing on historical sources such as James Madison's contributions during the Federal Convention debates (1787). However, they diverge sharply in their conclusions about how this history should shape contemporary constitutional adjudication.