Non-alignment is a foreign policy position in which a state refrains from entering into formal military alliances with major power blocs, particularly during periods of great-power competition. The term is most closely associated with the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), a formal grouping established in 1961 whose founding members sought to avoid alignment with either the United States-led Western bloc or the Soviet-led Eastern bloc during the Cold War. More broadly, non-alignment describes any policy of deliberate strategic independence, including historical traditions of permanent neutrality and what is sometimes called “strategic autonomy.”

The concept draws on older traditions of state neutrality - Switzerland's permanent neutrality, codified through the Congress of Vienna (1815), is a frequently cited precursor - but the 20th-century doctrine of non-alignment emerged specifically from the post-World War II decolonization era. Newly independent states in Asia, Africa, and Latin America sought to exercise sovereignty without being absorbed into superpower rivalry. The 1955 Bandung Conference, convened by Indonesia, India, Burma, Pakistan, and Ceylon, is widely regarded as a foundational event, producing a set of principles emphasizing sovereignty, non-aggression, and non-interference. The NAM was formally constituted at the Belgrade Conference in 1961, with Jawaharlal Nehru of India, Josip Broz Tito of Yugoslavia, Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, and Sukarno of Indonesia among its principal architects.

At its peak during the Cold War, the NAM claimed membership from a large proportion of the world's states.¹⁾ Its practical coherence was always contested; critics noted that several member states maintained close relationships with one superpower or the other, and that the movement lacked enforcement mechanisms. With the Cold War's end, the NAM's original rationale dissolved, though the organization continues to hold summits and advocate positions on sovereignty, development, and multipolarity.

In contemporary usage, non-alignment has acquired new relevance as analysts describe a multipolar order defined by competition among the United States, China, and other regional powers. States such as India, Brazil, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are frequently described as pursuing non-aligned or “multi-aligned” strategies - maintaining relations with competing powers without committing exclusively to any. The precise meaning of these terms in a multipolar context remains actively debated.

The United States has had a complex and sometimes adversarial relationship with the non-alignment concept. American policymakers during the early Cold War, particularly Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, tended to view neutrality as implicitly favorable to Soviet interests. President Kennedy's Alliance for Progress represented a notable attempt to engage non-aligned and developing states on terms distinct from Cold War bloc competition. For the history of American foreign policy engagement with non-aligned states, see United States - History.

Non-alignment as a doctrine and a movement has attracted sharply different assessments:

• Non-alignment as genuine independence: Some analysts and practitioners argue that non-alignment represents the most rational foreign policy for smaller or middle powers, preserving sovereignty and maximizing diplomatic flexibility. Non-Alignment - Strategic Autonomy Viewpoint

• Non-alignment as illusory or hypocritical: Critics contend that formally non-aligned states routinely depended on one bloc's security guarantees, economic aid, or arms transfers, rendering the doctrine largely nominal. Non-Alignment - Cold War Critique Viewpoint

• Non-alignment as anti-Western positioning: Some analysts argue the NAM functioned in practice as a vehicle for third-world solidarity that was disproportionately critical of Western powers while extending tolerance to Soviet conduct. Non-Alignment - Anti-Western Bias Viewpoint

• Non-alignment as a model for the multipolar era: Contemporary advocates argue that the logic of non-alignment is newly applicable as middle powers navigate U.S.-China competition, and that a revived doctrine of strategic autonomy serves both national and global stability interests. Non-Alignment - Multipolarity Viewpoint

• Non-Alignment - History
• Non-Alignment - Debate
• Non-Aligned Movement
• Cold War
• Neutrality
• Strategic Autonomy
• Bandung Conference
• Multipolarity
• United States - History

1. Peter Willetts, The Non-Aligned Movement: The Origins of a Third World Alliance (London: Frances Pinter, 1978).
2. G.H. Jansen, Afro-Asia and Non-Alignment (London: Faber and Faber, 1966).
3. Robert A. Mortimer, The Third World Coalition in International Politics (New York: Praeger, 1980).
4. “Final Communiqué of the Asian-African Conference,” Bandung, 24 April 1955.
5. Lorenz Lüthi, “Non-Alignment, 1961-2011,” in The Oxford Handbook of the Cold War, ed. Richard H. Immerman and Petra Goedde (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
6. Shivshankar Menon, India and Asian Geopolitics: The Past, Present (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2021).