Neoconservatism is a political tendency that emerged in the United States during the 1960s and 1970s, broadly characterized by support for an assertive American foreign policy, including the promotion of liberal democracy abroad through military force if necessary, combined with skepticism of the welfare state and a rejection of the New Left cultural politics of the 1960s. The precise definition of neoconservatism is contested: proponents have described it as a pragmatic conservatism informed by liberal democratic ideals, while critics have characterized it as an ideology prioritizing American primacy and military intervention abroad.

Neoconservatism reached its greatest political influence during the administration of George W. Bush (2001-2009), when figures associated with the tendency occupied prominent positions in the Defense Department and the National Security Council. The 2003 invasion of Iraq is widely regarded as the most consequential policy expression of neoconservative foreign policy thinking, though the degree to which the invasion was neoconservative in origin versus a product of broader post-September 11 political pressures remains actively debated.

Following the difficulties of the Iraq and Afghanistan occupations, neoconservatism faced sustained criticism from across the political spectrum. The rise of nationalist populism within the Republican Party after 2015 displaced neoconservative voices from the party's mainstream, though many neoconservative writers and policy figures remained active in think tanks, journals, and advisory roles. Debates persist over whether neoconservatism represents a coherent and durable intellectual tradition or a historically contingent coalition that has now largely dissolved.

On domestic policy, neoconservatism is generally associated with acceptance of a limited welfare state, strong support for Israel, and emphasis on traditional civic values. Its relationship to other strands of American conservatism - including paleoconservatism and social conservatism - has been a source of ongoing internal dispute on the American right.

Conservative supporters argue that neoconservatism represents a realistic and morally serious foreign policy rooted in the recognition that American power can be a force for democratic order worldwide, and that strong defense posture deters adversaries. See neoconservatism-conservative-supportive-viewpoint.

Progressive critics contend that neoconservatism functions as ideological cover for American imperial ambition, that its interventionist projects have caused widespread harm, and that its influence within the Democratic Party during the 1990s and 2000s contributed to militarized foreign policy. See neoconservatism-progressive-critical-viewpoint.

Paleoconservative and nationalist critics argue that neoconservatism is incompatible with traditional American conservatism, that it subordinates national interest to ideological projects abroad, and that its advocates wield disproportionate influence over Republican foreign policy. See neoconservatism-paleoconservative-critical-viewpoint.

Realist critics hold that neoconservative foreign policy overestimates the ability of external military force to produce stable democratic governance, and that it consistently underweights the costs and unintended consequences of intervention. See neoconservatism-foreign-policy-realist-critical-viewpoint.

Neoconservative self-description emphasizes intellectual origins in Cold War liberalism and anti-totalitarianism, continuity with the Wilsonian tradition in American foreign policy, and a pragmatic rather than ideological orientation. See neoconservatism-neoconservative-self-description-viewpoint.

The role of neoconservative officials and intellectuals in building the case for the 2003 invasion of Iraq, including questions about the use and presentation of intelligence, generated substantial documented dispute. See neoconservatism-iraq-war-rationale-controversy.

Allegations that neoconservatism disproportionately reflects the foreign policy interests of a particular ethnic or religious constituency have been a recurring and contested charge with identifiable participants and a documented public record. See neoconservatism-ethnic-influence-allegations-controversy.

• neoconservatism-history - Historical development from the 1960s through the present
• neoconservatism-iraq-war-rationale-controversy - Controversy over the Iraq War's intellectual and political origins
• neoconservatism-foreign-policy-debate - Debate over the efficacy and ethics of neoconservative foreign policy
• neoconservatism-conservative-supportive-viewpoint - Viewpoint: Conservative supporters
• neoconservatism-progressive-critical-viewpoint - Viewpoint: Progressive critics
• neoconservatism-paleoconservative-critical-viewpoint - Viewpoint: Paleoconservative and nationalist critics
• neoconservatism-foreign-policy-realist-critical-viewpoint - Viewpoint: Realist critics
• neoconservatism-neoconservative-self-description-viewpoint - Viewpoint: Neoconservative self-description
• neoconservatism-conservative-progressive-viewpoint-debate - Viewpoint Debate: Conservative vs. progressive assessments
• American Conservatism - Main Topic: American conservatism
• american-foreign-policy - Main Topic: American foreign policy
• Iraq War - Main Topic: The Iraq War
• Paleoconservatism - Main Topic: Paleoconservatism

1. Irving Kristol, “The Neoconservative Persuasion,” The Weekly Standard, 25 August 2003. 2. Justin Vaïsse, Neoconservatism: The Biography of a Movement, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010). 3. Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke, America Alone: The Neo-Conservatives and the Global Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 4. Francis Fukuyama, America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006). 5. Jacob Heilbrunn, They Knew They Were Right: The Rise of the Neocons (New York: Doubleday, 2008). 6. Gary Dorrien, Imperial Designs: Neoconservatism and the New Pax Americana (New York: Routledge, 2004).