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judicial-review

Judicial Review

Judicial review is the power of courts to assess whether a law, executive action, or other governmental act conforms to a written constitution, and to refuse to enforce acts found inconsistent with it. In the United States, the term most commonly refers to the authority of federal courts, and ultimately the United States Supreme Court, to invalidate legislation or executive conduct that conflicts with the Constitution of the United States. The precise scope of this power-how aggressively courts should exercise it, and what interpretive methods should guide its use-is contested; see Constitutional Interpretation and the viewpoints below.

Current State

Judicial review is exercised by federal and state courts throughout the United States and is a well-established feature of American constitutional government. The Supreme Court asserted this power for federal courts over acts of Congress in *Marbury v. Madison* (1803), though the Constitution's text does not explicitly grant it. Courts at all levels routinely consider constitutional challenges to statutes and government action, and Supreme Court decisions on such questions are treated as binding precedent unless later overruled.

The practice remains debated on several fronts: the legitimacy and proper limits of judicial review relative to the elected branches (the Administrative State and Separation of Powers), the interpretive methods judges should use, and historical episodes-such as the Roosevelt Court-Packing Plan and the broader Court Packing 1937 - Debate-in which the scope or composition of the reviewing court itself became a matter of political contest. For historical development, see Judicial Review - History.

Viewpoints

  • Strong judicial review - Courts should actively enforce constitutional limits against the political branches, including in politically sensitive areas, to protect rights and structural constraints from majoritarian overreach. See judicial-review-strong-review-viewpoint.
  • Judicial restraint / deference - Courts should defer to the judgments of elected legislatures and the executive except in cases of clear constitutional violation, reserving review for exceptional circumstances. See judicial-review-restraint-viewpoint.
  • Originalism / textualism - Judicial review should be exercised according to the original public meaning of constitutional text, limiting judicial discretion to depart from that meaning. See judicial-review-originalist-viewpoint.
  • Living constitutionalism - The Constitution's meaning may evolve with changing social understanding, and judicial review should reflect that evolving interpretation. See judicial-review-living-constitutionalism-viewpoint.
  • Departmentalism / popular constitutionalism - Each branch of government, and ultimately the people themselves, share responsibility for constitutional interpretation; the judiciary should not hold exclusive or final interpretive authority. See judicial-review-departmentalist-viewpoint.
  • Critique of judicial supremacy - The practice of treating Supreme Court rulings as final and binding on the other branches lacks clear textual constitutional basis and concentrates excessive power in unelected judges. See judicial-review-anti-supremacy-viewpoint.

Controversies

  • The Supreme Court's use of judicial review to strike down New Deal legislation in the 1930s, and Franklin Roosevelt's subsequent proposal to expand the Court's membership, remains a documented dispute over the proper scope of judicial review and judicial independence. See judicial-review-court-packing-controversy.
  • The Supreme Court's 1954 decision in *Brown v. Board of Education*, exercising judicial review to invalidate state-mandated racial segregation in public schools, generated extensive debate over the legitimacy and reasoning of judicial review in advancing social change. See judicial-review-brown-v-board-controversy.

Footnotes

  1. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
  2. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
  3. Alexander M. Bickel, *The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1962).
  4. Larry D. Kramer, *The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
  5. Jeff Shesol, *Supreme Power: Franklin Roosevelt vs. the Supreme Court* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2010).
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