Table of Contents
European Defense - Debate
The central contested question in European defense policy is whether Europe should pursue substantial strategic autonomy - independent or semi-independent military capacity, command structures, and procurement - or whether European security is best served by continued deep integration with the United States through NATO. This question has grown more urgent since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the re-election of Donald Trump in 2024, and the subsequent transatlantic friction that has prompted Europe to reexamine its dependence on American military power. Competing positions disagree on whether American commitment to European security is reliably durable, whether European institutions can generate the political will and capability to fill any gap, and whether the pursuit of autonomy strengthens or weakens collective deterrence.
The Case for European Strategic Autonomy
Proponents of greater European strategic independence argue that decades of underinvestment in European defense were premised on a level of American commitment that can no longer be assumed. They point to bipartisan American consensus that China represents the primary strategic challenge, explicit questioning of Article 5 obligations by senior American officials, and concrete adjustments in U.S. force posture toward the Indo-Pacific as evidence that Europe's dependence on American security guarantees represents a structural vulnerability rather than a temporary political fluctuation.
On this view, the Russia threat is primarily a European problem requiring a primarily European answer. Advocates contend that the EU's combined economic resources dwarf Russia's in nearly every relevant dimension, and that Europe's failure to translate that economic weight into military capacity has been a political choice, not a structural impossibility. France, the EU, and associated voices argue that a credible European defense pillar - encompassing its own intelligence architecture, command structures, and defense-industrial base - would strengthen rather than undermine NATO by giving the alliance a more capable European partner.
Proponents also argue that dependence on American weapons systems and the U.S. Foreign Military Sales program - which accounted for 51% of European NATO countries' equipment spending between 2022 and 20241) - exposes Europe to export-control decisions, production bottlenecks, and political cycles in Washington over which it has no influence. Redirecting procurement to European defense industries, they argue, would close capability gaps while generating economic returns in jobs, innovation, and industrial capacity, as argued in the EU's 2025 Defense Readiness White Paper.
In March 2025, the European Commission unveiled plans for member states to borrow up to EUR 150 billion for defense loans, pool procurement, and reduce fragmentation in European defense industry. Germany simultaneously adopted a major fiscal package excluding defense spending above 1% of GDP from its constitutional debt ceiling and establishing a EUR 500 billion infrastructure fund.2) Advocates cite these steps as evidence that the political will for serious European defense integration exists, and that the question is now one of execution rather than ambition.
The Case for NATO Primacy and Transatlantic Integration
Critics of European strategic autonomy argue that the concept conflates political symbolism with military reality. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte has stated bluntly that Europe “cannot defend itself without America,” citing European dependence on American capabilities in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), strategic lift, command and control, and the extended nuclear deterrent.3) On this view, a “European NATO” would require - at minimum - a unified command structure, integrated defense industrial base, common strategic doctrine, shared intelligence architecture, and political will to make binding collective defense commitments without an American backstop. Critics argue that none of these elements are close to existing.
Skeptics further contend that predictions of American withdrawal from Europe have proven premature across multiple cycles - from the burden-sharing debates of the 1960s through the post-Cold War drawdown and the Trump first term - and that treating the current moment as uniquely decisive risks overreaction that could damage the alliance. Eastern European members, in particular Poland and the Baltic states, have historically preferred American guarantees over EU-led alternatives, viewing U.S. forces and nuclear deterrence as the only credible check on Russian aggression. For these states, emphasis on EU autonomy is a distraction that could weaken the transatlantic link at the moment it is most needed.
Critics of EU-led defense integration also point to persistent intra-European disagreements on strategic doctrine, burden-sharing, and threat prioritization as evidence that the EU lacks the political cohesion necessary to act as a defense actor. Past EU defense initiatives - including PESCO and the European Defence Fund - have, in the view of critics, generated substantial process and limited capability. U.S. critics, including those associated with the Heritage Foundation, have argued that EU defense efforts duplicate NATO structures, reduce interoperability with American systems, and fragment the transatlantic defense industrial sector.4) The concern is not that Europe will become too strong, but that misallocated effort will leave it weaker while alienating Washington.
A related argument holds that Europe's capacity gap cannot be closed quickly enough to matter. Reaching the 2025 Hague Summit's commitment of 3.5% of GDP on core defense (the core component of the summit's broader 5% target, which includes defense-related spending) by 2035 would require at least EUR 288 billion in additional annual expenditure by European NATO members.5) Skeptics argue that European defense industries lack the production capacity to absorb that investment rapidly, and that in the interim Europe remains dependent on American systems regardless of its political ambitions.
The Hybrid and Middle Positions
A range of analysts and policymakers argue that the autonomy-versus-integration framing presents a false choice. France's foreign minister Jean-Noel Barrot articulated the most widely cited middle position, framing enhanced European defense responsibility as a “European pillar” inside NATO rather than as an alternative to it - increased European agency without abandoning the transatlantic deterrence architecture.6)
On this view, the realistic near-term outcome is a hybrid model: Europe gradually acquires partial autonomy in conventional defense, regional crisis management, and cyber operations while remaining reliant on American capabilities in strategic lift, ISR, and nuclear deterrence. The burden-sharing debate is reframed not as Europe replacing the United States but as Europe assuming primary responsibility for conventional land defense on NATO's eastern flank while the U.S. retains its extended deterrence role and redirects attention to the Indo-Pacific.
Proponents of this position argue it is internally coherent only if Europe closes real capability gaps and accepts deeper integration in procurement and planning - areas where European policy has historically underperformed. Critics from both directions argue the middle position papers over genuine incompatibilities: either European institutions acquire the political will for real integration, or the “European pillar” rhetoric becomes a cover for continued dependence dressed in new language.
Points of Agreement
Despite the depth of the disagreement, parties across the debate generally concur on several propositions:
- European defense spending was inadequate for too long and must increase substantially.
- Russia's war in Ukraine has changed the European security environment in ways that
require a structural rather than marginal response.
- European defense industry capacity needs to expand and fragmentation in procurement
needs to be reduced, regardless of whether that procurement is coordinated through
NATO or EU mechanisms. * Some degree of European capability development is desirable and would reduce the burden on the United States, even among those skeptical of full strategic autonomy.