Employment Division v. Smith
Lede
*Employment Division v. Smith*, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), is a landmark United States Supreme Court case that redefined the interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. The case centered on Oregon's controlled substance and unemployment disqualification statutes, which denied unemployment benefits to individuals discharged for violating state criminal laws prohibiting the use of peyote, a controlled substance. Alfred Smith and Galen Black challenged the statute after both were fired from their jobs due to their sacramental use of peyote in a ceremony of the Native American Church. The Supreme Court ruled that laws neutral on their face and generally applicable do not violate the Free Exercise Clause, overturning decades of precedent that had required stricter scrutiny for laws burdening religious practices. This decision established the “neutral law of general applicability” standard, which significantly narrowed the protections available under the Free Exercise Clause.
Current State
The decision in *Employment Division v. Smith* fundamentally altered the legal landscape of religious freedom by overruling prior precedents such as *Sherbert v. Verner* (1963) and *Wisconsin v. Yoder* (1972), which had required strict scrutiny for laws burdening religious exercise. Instead, the Court established the “neutral law of general applicability” standard, holding that laws that apply evenly to all individuals, regardless of religion, do not violate the Free Exercise Clause unless they are specifically targeted at religious practices.
In response to *Smith*, Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) in 1993 (Pub. L. 103-141), which sought to restore the compelling interest test for federal laws burdening religious exercise. However, the Supreme Court later limited RFRA's application to federal law in *City of Boerne v. Flores* (1997). Many states subsequently adopted their own versions of RFRA or similar statutes to provide broader protections for religious liberty at the state level.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has subsequently applied *Smith*'s framework, interpreting its scope and limits in various cases involving religious exemptions from generally applicable laws. While *Smith* narrowed federal constitutional protections for religious exercise, the patchwork of state RFRAs and lower court rulings has created a complex legal environment for religious freedom claims.
Viewpoints
The *Employment Division v. Smith* decision elicited diverse responses from legal scholars and policymakers. Justice Antonin Scalia's majority opinion argued that the Free Exercise Clause should not override generally applicable laws, asserting a strict constitutionalist position employment-division-v-smith-strict-constitutionalism-viewpoint. Scholars like Douglas Laycock criticized the ruling, contending that laws should be modified to accommodate religious exercise when possible, as the decision weakened protections for religious minorities employment-division-v-smith-religious-accommodation-viewpoint. Philip Hamburger defended an originalist interpretation, claiming that courts had misapplied the First Amendment's original meaning by imposing heightened scrutiny on neutral laws employment-division-v-smith-originalist-interpretation-viewpoint. Senator Ted Kennedy sponsored the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) as a legislative solution to address perceived gaps in judicial protections after *Smith* employment-division-v-smith-rfra-sponsorship-viewpoint. The American Center for Law and Justice argued that RFRA was necessary to protect religious minorities whose exercise of faith would otherwise be burdened by neutral laws of general application, while Americans United for Separation of Church and State contended that RFRA unconstitutionally privileged religious conduct over secular conduct and risked government entanglement with religion employment-division-v-smith-aclj-ausc-viewpoint-debate.
Related Pages
* free-exercise-clause-interpretation-history * religious-freedom-restoration-act-explanation * state-religious-freedom-restoration-acts-comparison * religious-accommodations-in-employment-case-studies
Footnotes
1. Douglas Laycock, “Religious Liberty,” *Virginia Law Review* 104 (2014): 935-976. 2. Philip Hamburger, *Separation of Church and State* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002). 3. *Employment Division v. Smith*, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), https://www.oyez.org/cases/1989/88-115. 4. *Religious Freedom Restoration Act*, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (November 16, 1993).
