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David Hume
David Hume (7 May 1711 - 25 August 1776) was a Scottish philosopher, historian, and essayist widely regarded as one of the most influential figures in the Western philosophical tradition. His work spans epistemology, metaphysics, ethics, philosophy of religion, and political economy. Hume is most closely associated with Empiricism - the view that knowledge derives primarily from sensory experience - and with a rigorous skepticism about the limits of human reason. Some aspects of his legacy, including the scope of his skepticism, his views on causation, and the implications of his Naturalism, remain subjects of active philosophical debate.
Current State of Knowledge
Hume's major works - A Treatise of Human Nature (1739-40), the two Enquiries (1748, 1751), and the posthumously published Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1779) - are standard texts in academic philosophy and history of ideas. His bundle theory of the self, problem of induction, and is-ought gap are taught as foundational problems across analytic and continental traditions alike.
His fork between “relations of ideas” and “matters of fact” - sometimes called Hume's fork - remains a central reference point in epistemology, though its precise interpretation and significance are disputed. His account of causation as observed regularity rather than necessary connection continues to generate debate in metaphysics and philosophy of science. His treatment of miracles in Section X of the first Enquiry is among the most discussed passages in philosophy of religion.
Hume's political and economic writings, including the Essays and his History of England, influenced Adam Smith, Immanuel Kant (who credited Hume with waking him from “dogmatic slumber”), and later utilitarian thinkers. His views on race, expressed in a footnote to the essay “Of National Characters,” have drawn renewed critical attention and are addressed in the Controversies section below.
For extended historical background, see david-hume-history.
Consensus Status
There is broad agreement among historians of philosophy that Hume represents a pivotal point in the development of modern Empiricism and skepticism, and that his challenge to rationalist metaphysics shaped the subsequent trajectory of both analytic and continental philosophy. This assessment is independently held across institutions and scholarly traditions. See david-hume-consensus-philosophical-significance-consensus.
No comparable consensus exists on the correct interpretation of his core doctrines - particularly causation, personal identity, and the extent of his skepticism - which remain live debates.
Viewpoints
Hume as radical skeptic: On this reading, Hume's arguments systematically undermine the rational foundations of science, morality, and religion. His skepticism is not merely methodological but genuine and corrosive. See david-hume-radical-skeptic-viewpoint.
Hume as naturalist: Many interpreters hold that Hume's skeptical arguments are deployed within a broader naturalistic project - describing how human beings actually form beliefs through custom, habit, and sentiment, rather than arguing that belief is impossible. Skepticism clears the ground; naturalism rebuilds it. See david-hume-naturalist-viewpoint.
Hume as proto-positivist: Logical positivists and some analytic philosophers read Hume's fork and his dismissal of metaphysics as anticipating verificationism and the project of scientific philosophy. See david-hume-proto-positivist-viewpoint.
Hume as sentimentalist in ethics: Hume grounded moral judgment in sentiment rather than reason - “reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions.” On this view, his ethics anticipates Moral Sentimentalism and poses a standing challenge to rationalist moral theories. See david-hume-moral-sentimentalism-viewpoint.
Hume as religious skeptic or covert atheist: His Dialogues and the essay on miracles are read by some as a sustained dismantling of natural theology and revealed religion, amounting to functional atheism expressed cautiously under social constraint. Others read the Dialogues as genuinely agnostic. See david-hume-religious-skepticism-viewpoint and david-hume-religious-skepticism-viewpoint-debate.
Hume as conservative or Tory historian: His History of England has been interpreted as a work of moderate Toryism, skeptical of Whig historiography and the myth of ancient English liberties. Others dispute the political label while acknowledging his revisionism. See david-hume-tory-historian-viewpoint.
Controversies
The race footnote: A 1753 revision to “Of National Characters” added a footnote asserting the probable natural inferiority of non-white peoples; the controversy concerns how to weigh this against Hume's broader philosophy and how institutions bearing his name should respond. See david-hume-race-footnote-controversy.
Removal from the Index and reception by the Church: Hume's works attracted ecclesiastical condemnation and his name appeared in Catholic prohibited-book lists; the controversy concerns the grounds for condemnation and whether they reflected genuine philosophical engagement or institutional reflex. See Index of Forbidden Books and david-hume-index-controversy.
Relationship to William of Ockham: Scholars debate the extent to which Hume's empiricism and his skepticism about causal necessity constitute a revival or extension of Ockhamist nominalism, and whether the resemblance is historical influence or structural convergence. See William of Ockham and david-hume-ockham-connection-debate.
The Treatise versus the Enquiries: Hume himself later distanced himself from the Treatise, calling it a “juvenile work”; scholars dispute which texts represent his considered views and whether the Enquiries revise or merely popularize the earlier arguments. See david-hume-treatise-enquiries-debate.
Related Pages
Footnotes
1. David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, 2nd ed. rev. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978). Originally published 1739-40. 2. David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (London, 1748); An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (London, 1751). 3. David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, ed. Norman Kemp Smith (Edinburgh: Nelson, 1947). Originally published posthumously 1779. 4. David Hume, The History of England from the Invasion of Julius Caesar to the Revolution in 1688, 6 vols. (London, 1754-62). 5. Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics (1783), Preface; the “dogmatic slumber” remark is the standard English rendering of Kant's account of Hume's effect on him. 6. Norman Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume (London: Macmillan, 1941). Influential statement of the naturalist interpretation. 7. A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic (London: Gollancz, 1936). For the positivist reading of Hume. 8. Barry Stroud, Hume (London: Routledge, 1977). Standard analytic treatment; leans toward the skeptical reading. 9. Peter Millican, “Hume's Old and New: Four Fashionable Falsehoods, and One Unfashionable Truth,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 81 (2007): 163-99. 10. David Hume, “Of National Characters,” in Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary, ed. Eugene F. Miller (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1987), 208n10. The footnote was added in the 1753 edition and expanded in 1754. 11. Felix Waldmann, “David Hume and the Index Librorum Prohibitorum,” Scottish Historical Review 91, no. 232 (2012): 214-22. 12. For the Ockham-Hume connection, see Marilyn McCord Adams, William Ockham, 2 vols. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987) for background on Ockhamist nominalism, and related literature on Hume's account of causation and occasionalism.