The term NSA surveillance program refers broadly to the collection of intelligence-gathering operations conducted by the United States National Security Agency (NSA), particularly those that involve the interception, storage, and analysis of electronic communications - including telephone metadata, internet traffic, and digital correspondence - of both foreign nationals and, in some cases, American citizens. The scope, legal basis, and permissibility of these programs are subjects of ongoing legal and political dispute; what constitutes “surveillance,” who qualifies as a legitimate target, and whether particular activities fall within constitutional and statutory limits are contested questions linked to from the viewpoints section below.
Public knowledge of NSA surveillance activities expanded dramatically following disclosures made in June 2013 by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden, who provided classified documents to journalists at The Guardian and The Washington Post. The disclosed materials revealed several previously unknown or undisclosed programs, including PRISM - through which the NSA reportedly obtained user data from major technology companies - and the bulk collection of domestic telephone metadata under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act.1)
The legal architecture governing NSA surveillance includes the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978, the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, the FISA Amendments Act of 2008, and the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, which imposed new limits on bulk metadata collection. Oversight is exercised by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), the congressional intelligence committees, and the executive branch's Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB), though the degree to which these mechanisms constitute meaningful checks is itself debated.2)
Courts have reached divergent conclusions on the constitutional questions. In Klayman v. Obama (2013), a federal district court found bulk metadata collection likely violated the Fourth Amendment; a second federal district court reached the opposite conclusion weeks later in ACLU v. Clapper.3) The Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in 2015 that the Section 215 bulk collection program exceeded statutory authority, though it declined to reach the constitutional question.4)
Under President Barack Obama, the administration defended the programs' legality while simultaneously ordering reviews of their scope. Obama announced a series of reforms in January 2014, including new limits on collection of communications of foreign leaders and enhanced privacy protections for non-U.S. persons.5) The NSA's bulk telephone metadata program formally ended under the USA FREEDOM Act in 2015, though other collection authorities remain active.
For a fuller account of the development of NSA surveillance authorities from the mid-twentieth century through the post-Snowden reform period, see nsa-surveillance-program-history.
Viewpoints on NSA surveillance programs divide broadly along lines of security efficacy, constitutional interpretation, and democratic accountability.
1. Glenn Greenwald and Ewen MacAskill, “NSA Prism Program Taps into User Data of Apple, Google and Others,” The Guardian, 7 June 2013.
2. Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, Report on the Telephone Records Program Conducted under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act and the Operations of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (Washington, D.C.: PCLOB, 23 January 2014).
3. Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013); ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
4. ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787 (2d Cir. 2015).
5. Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President on Review of Signals Intelligence,” 17 January 2014, Office of the Press Secretary, The White House.