Indo-Pacific Strategy refers to the diplomatic, economic, and military policies pursued by the United States and partner countries to shape the balance of power across the Indian and Pacific Oceans, an area generally understood to stretch from the western coast of India to the Pacific island states and the western United States. The term is most closely associated with U.S. policy since the late 2010s, but is also used by Australia, Japan, India, the United Kingdom, the European Union, and members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to describe their own regional frameworks. The phrase itself, and the geographic and conceptual boundaries it implies, are subjects of dispute; see indo-pacific-strategy-definitional-scope-debate.
Core instruments commonly grouped under the term include the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) among the United States, Japan, India, and Australia; the AUKUS partnership among Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States; bilateral and trilateral alliances such as those linking the United States with Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines; economic frameworks such as the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework; and a broader set of diplomatic, infrastructure, and critical-minerals initiatives. Many of these arrangements are explicitly framed as responses to the growing military and economic power of the People's Republic of China (PRC). For background on the term's emergence and its predecessor framings, see indo-pacific-strategy-history.
As of 2026, Indo-Pacific strategy remains organized around a set of “minilateral” groupings rather than a single treaty alliance comparable to NATO. AUKUS, originally announced in 2021 as a trilateral security partnership among Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, has two pillars: Pillar I concerns the transfer of nuclear submarine propulsion technology to Australia, and Pillar II concerns collaboration on advanced defense technologies. U.S. Secretary of War Pete Hegseth (the position formerly titled Secretary of Defense) has indicated continued U.S. support for AUKUS, and Australia's 2024 National Defence Strategy reaffirmed the partnership as central to deterring what it described as Chinese “coercive tactics.”
U.S. officials testifying before Congress in mid-2026 described the Quad, trilateral cooperation with Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines, and AUKUS as central pillars of an “America First” approach to the region, emphasizing diversification of critical-mineral supply chains away from China and continued attention to freedom of navigation and the situation across the Taiwan Strait. A Chinese state-media commentary argued that without tangible political and economic results, the Quad risks becoming a largely formal grouping overshadowed by bilateral alliances and AUKUS.
The 2026 U.S. National Defense Strategy marked a shift toward an explicit “peace through strength” framing, emphasizing homeland defense, deterrence of China along the first island chain, and pressure on allies such as Japan, Australia, South Korea, and India to increase their own defense investment. Observers have noted that the document does not name Taiwan explicitly, a departure from prior strategies that some analysts read as ambiguity and others read as continuity with a long-standing policy of strategic ambiguity. Reactions among Southeast Asian states to these minilateral arrangements have varied, with some states expressing concern about regional stability and others abstaining from public comment to avoid the appearance of aligning with either Washington or Beijing.
Indo-Pacific strategy intersects closely with debates over the future of U.S. alliance commitments in Europe; see NATO - Retrenchment Viewpoint for the related question of whether U.S. resources and attention are shifting from the Atlantic to the Pacific theater. It is also inseparable from the broader trajectory of United States-China Relations, of which Indo-Pacific strategy is frequently described as the regional security dimension.