Table of Contents

American Federalism

American federalism is the constitutional arrangement by which governmental authority in the United States is divided between a national (federal) government and the governments of the individual states. The system is established by the U.S. Constitution, which grants enumerated powers to the federal government, reserves other powers to the states or the people via the Tenth Amendment, and defines rules for the interaction between the two levels. American federalism is distinct from both a unitary system - in which a central government holds supreme authority - and a confederation - in which member states retain ultimate sovereignty. The precise boundary between federal and state authority has been contested since the Constitution's ratification in 1788 and remains a live legal and political question.

Background

The structure emerged from the failures of the Articles of Confederation (1781-1789), which created a weak central government unable to tax, regulate commerce, or enforce its own laws. The Constitution replaced it with a stronger federal framework, but the degree of that strength was immediately contested. The founding generation disagreed sharply over how much power the new national government was intended to hold, a debate recorded in the Federalist Papers, the Anti-Federalist writings, and the ratification conventions of the states. For the longer arc of this dispute, see American Federalism - History.

Current State of Debate

Several structural features of American federalism remain the subject of ongoing legal, political, and scholarly dispute:

The balance of federal and state authority has shifted substantially over U.S. history, most dramatically during Reconstruction, the New Deal, and the civil rights era. The direction and legitimacy of each of those shifts remains contested. See American Federalism - Debate.

Consensus Status

There is broad legal consensus that the Constitution establishes a system of dual sovereignty in which neither the federal government nor the states are wholly subordinate to the other, and that neither may “commandeer” the other's governmental machinery (see New York v. United States, 1992; Printz v. United States, 1997). Beyond that structural baseline, scholarly and judicial consensus fractures on nearly every significant boundary question. See American Federalism - Constitutional Law Consensus.

Viewpoints

Footnotes

  1. U.S. Constitution, Art. I § 8; Art. VI § 2; Amend. X.
  2. Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, The Federalist Papers (1787-1788), particularly Federalist No. 39 (Madison) and No. 45 (Madison) on the division of powers.
  3. Herbert J. Storing, ed., The Complete Anti-Federalist (University of Chicago Press, 1981).
  4. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819) - foundational ruling on implied federal powers and state limits.
  5. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) - reestablishing outer limits of the Commerce Clause.
  6. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) - anti-commandeering doctrine.
  7. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) - federal spending conditions and state autonomy.
  8. Edward S. Corwin, “The Passing of Dual Federalism,” 36 Virginia Law Review 1 (1950) - influential account of the New Deal shift.
  9. Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies, 6th ed. (Wolters Kluwer, 2019) - standard nationalist scholarly treatment.
  10. Randy E. Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution (Princeton University Press, 2004) - influential originalist/libertarian critique.